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Abstract
There are two broad opposing classes of attitudes to reality (re-
alist vs idealist, material vs mental) with corresponding attitudes to
knowledge (objective vs subjective, scientific vs romantic). I argue
that these attitudes can be compatible, and that quantum theory re-
quires us to adopt both of them.
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In their conversation on the nature of reality on 14th July, 1930 (Singer
(2001)), Albert Einstein and Rabindranath Tagore personified the division
between two broad classes of attitude toward the world: one matter-based,
centred on an external world in which human beings form a small part,
and emphasising the thinginess of things; the other mind-based, centred on
human experience and emphasising human creativity and imagination. This
characterisation may suggest a division between the scientific and artistic
sensibilities, and those are indeed the roles played by Einstein and Tagore
in their dialogue; but proponents of the two world views do not separate so
neatly according to their pursuits. Moreover, just as scientific and artistic
interests are not necessarily antagonistic, so these two attitudes to reality
are not necessarily contradictory. I will argue that the effort to achieve a
fully scientific understanding of the world impels us to adopt both stances
simultaneously.
For Tagore, everything relates to the human mind: “the Truth of the
Universe is human Truth”. Einstein, on the other hand, believes in “the
world as a reality independent of the human factor”. These seem appropriate
positions for the poet and musician on the one hand, working always with
immediately felt experience, and the scientist on the other, seeking to detach
himself from his fallible senses and attain impersonal certainty by the light of
cold reason. Interestingly, though, it is Tagore who attempts to support his
position by rational argument, while Einstein simply states his position as a
matter of faith: “I cannot prove that my conception is right, but that is my
religion”. His part in the conversation concludes “Then I am more religious
than you are!”
Tagore argues that
This world is a human world — the scientific view of it is also
that of the scientific man. Therefore the world apart from us does
not exist.
This is reminiscent of Derrida’s pronouncement “There is nothing outside
the text”, which inspired modern (or perhaps post-modern, i.e. pre-21st cen-
tury) sociologists of scientific knowledge like Andrew Pickering, for whom all
scientific knowledge is a “social construction” and who see it as their task
to explain what scientists believe without referring to the content of those
beliefs. We do not believe in quarks because there really are quarks which
scatter electrons in certain ways, but because ... well, I’m not quite sure why,
but it’s all very sociological (Pickering (1984)). Pickering believes that the
scientist’s explanation of our belief in quarks is circular, because he can see no
difference between “Quarks exist” and “We believe that quarks exist”. Many
scientists will find this as uncongenial as Einstein did, but well-brought-up
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quantum physicists may have qualms. Didn’t Bohr teach us that there is no
world beyond the scale of laboratory apparatus that we have constructed?
Doesn’t this support Tagore’s view, at least in the form “the world apart
from our apparatus does not exist”?
Einstein felt no need to give Tagore arguments in support of his belief
in an external reality. He presents it as a matter of faith. It could perhaps
be seen as a statement of intent: “I am determined to understand the world
as an external reality”.1 In these terms he might have seen Bohr’s quantum
mechanics as an admission of defeat. Margenau commented
Like most scientists, Einstein leaves unanswered the basic meta-
physical problem underlying all science, the meaning of external-
ity [Margenau (1949)],
but if belief in external reality is understood as a statement of intent, then the
belief needs no justification and “externality” needs no definition; Einstein
can simply say “I will know it when I see it” and go on looking for such an
understanding.
If one cannot completely analyse the concept of “external reality,” one can
certainly point to particular theories which exemplify it. The paradigmatic
example is Newton’s dream of a purely mechanical theory:
I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by
the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am
induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend
upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some
causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards
one another, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and
recede from one another. [Newton (1934)]
This has inspired the view that physical reality consists entirely of point par-
ticles, each of which has a definite position at every instant of time, together
with various other numerical properties such as mass and electric charge;
the motion of these particles is completely determined by the forces between
them. The reality of these particles owes nothing to human minds; it seems
to me to be a prime example of what could be meant by a concept of an
objective, external reality.
A statement that the physical aspects of reality could be exhaustively
described in such a way is not necessarily a denial that there are also human
aspects to reality, such as creativity, free will, morality and so on. But
it can certainly look like such a denial, and therefore arouses hostility in a
1For an account of Einstein’s realism along these lines, see chapter 6 of Fine (1997).
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romantic, artistic sensibility. This hostility is seen above all in William Blake.
Blake exalted freedom and creativity, and regarded reason as something to
be fought:
May God us keep
From single vision and Newtons sleep. [Blake (1980)]
In his mythology the restrictive, tyrannical God (and creator of the physical
world) is called Urizen, which can be heard as “your reason”.
Blake’s picture of Newton (Fig. 1) shows this single vision. Newton’s
objective reality is represented by a mathematical diagram, pale and unreal
compared to the rich, colourful but subjective reality which he is prevented
from seeing by his concentration on the objective but abstract, mathematical
aspects of reality. Blake does not deny the validity of Newton’s vision; it is
notable that Newton’s mathematical instrument is the same as that held by
God (Urizen) in Blakes’ picture of the creation of the world (Fig. 2). But
he is hostile to the singleness of this vision. In the words that Einstein used
about quantum theory, he denies its completeness.
Einstein’s idea of reality had different contents from Newton’s, but I
think he shared with Newton the idea of reality itself. They differed as to
what kinds of thing are real, but they agreed that there was something real,
whether or not it is observed or described, and independent of any observation
or description. Einstein’s commitment to realism, in this sense, was a major
reason, though not the only one, for his resistance to the claims of quantum
theory to be a possible final theory of the world. It is explicitly adduced as the
ground for his famous challenge, in the EPR paper (Einstein et al. (1935)),
to the completeness of “the quantum-mechanical description of reality”. This
argument also requires a principle of locality – as he later stated it, “the real
states of spatially separated objects are independent of each other” [Einstein
(1949b) p.682]. But this is introduced in an almost casual, incidental way at
the end of the EPR paper; it is the concept of reality that bears all the weight
of the argument. And this was only to be expected; as it had taken shape
as a coherent conceptual structure in the hands of Bohr and Heisenberg,
the understanding of quantum theory had come to be seen as inseparably
linked with an anti-realist attitude to scientific knowledge. Bohr repeatedly
insisted that the equations and mathematical objects of the theory were not
to be seen as pictures of a microscopic physical reality, but as algorithms for
calculating macroscopic effects which are all that humans can presume to
know – a position that was rejected by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR)
from the outset, in the very words of their title. In 1935, EPR and Bohr both
wrote papers entitled “Can the quantum-mechanical description of reality be
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Figure 2: The Ancient of Days by William Blake. The creator is Urizen,
representing law and reason; an entirely negative figure in Blake’s mythology.
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considered complete?” EPR’s answer was “No”. Bohr’s answer, essentially,
was “What reality?”
It is now generally agreed, following the brilliantly clear light that John
Bell shone on the problem, that realism and locality together are indeed
incompatible with quantum theory, and that the incompatibility is not a
metaphysical matter of opposing concepts, but a clear-cut question of con-
flicting predictions for the results of experiment. It has been possible to put
the question to the test, and the experimental verdict seems (almost, but not
quite, inarguably) a clear vindication of quantum theory.
Unfortunately, Einstein did not live to see Bell’s theorem. He would no
doubt have been as surprised as everyone else to see that the possibility of
completing quantum mechanics could be tested so decisively without any
need to consider what form the more complete theory might take. No doubt,
also, he would have felt the experimental results as a jarring blow to his
world-view. But, perhaps surprisingly, he would not have had to abandon
his fundamental faith in the existence of external physical reality. There are
in fact two ways in which quantum theory can still be seen as a realist de-
scription of the world. Both would have been found uncongenial by Einstein,
but perhaps not as uncongenial as abandoning his faith in external reality.
The first realist conception of quantum theory must have been known to
Einstein, as it was proposed by Louis de Broglie at the 1927 Solvay conference
at which Einstein was present. In de Broglie’s theory realism is achieved
in just the way assumed in the EPR paper: the quantum description of a
collection of particles is acknowledged to be incomplete, and is completed
by further elements of reality in the form of precise positions for each of the
particles. However, it explicitly violates the principle of locality which was
also assumed by EPR. At the Solvay conference it was subject to vigorous
attack, in particular by Pauli, in the face of which de Broglie withdrew the
theory, though it was later revived by David Bohm who showed that at
least some of Pauli’s criticisms were unfair. The nonlocality is undeniable,
however, and makes it difficult to reconcile this theory with relativity. Even
now that nonlocality is accepted by many physicists as an actual feature of
the world, there is little support for the de Broglie-Bohm theory.
The second option for realists only emerged after Einstein’s death, in
1957, when Everett and Wheeler published their “relative-state interpreta-
tion” of quantum theory (Everett (1957),Wheeler (1957)). Here we have an
opposite view to EPR; instead of regarding it as incomplete and in need of
further elements, Everett and Wheeler take the quantum-mechanical descrip-
tion of reality completely seriously and, indeed, remove from it an element
which had always seemed artificial and awkward. This element, known as
the “collapse of the wave function”, was probably motivated by realist han-
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kerings and was not found necessary by those who adhered rigorously to
Bohr’s anti-realist doctrine; but it sits uneasily with any attempt to take
quantum theory as a realistic account of the world. However, if the collapse
of the wave function is removed from this account, the world — or rather,
according to later accounts, many worlds — that emerges is so strange that
at first few people could accept it. In order to discuss this theory and defend
my characterisation of it as a realist view, I must step back and describe the
orthodox quantum theory from which it arose.
The following features of quantum theory had become established as com-
mon ground by 1935. Associated with any physical system is a mathematical
object (its “wave function” or “state vector”) which changes in time accord-
ing to a well-defined law (the Schro¨dinger equation) determined by the forces
acting on the system. The natural tendency is to regard this as analogous to
Newtonian mechanics, in which the physical system would be a collection of
particles, the mathematical object is a collection of geometrical points and
velocity vectors, and the change in time of this object, determined by the
forces acting on the particles, is given by Newton’s laws of motion. However,
in Newtonian mechanics one can find out the exact mathematical descrip-
tion of the system by observing the positions and velocities of the particles;
conversely, a specification of the mathematical description tells one exactly
what one would find on observing the system. In the microscopic world of
quantum theory, by contrast, it is not possible to observe enough properties
of the system to determine its state vector (one sometimes knows the state
vector if one has prepared the system in a particular way, but it is not possi-
ble to find out how someone else has prepared the system just by observing
it); and the mathematical description does not, in general, tell you what you
can expect to see on observing the system. It only tells you the possible
results of an observation and the probabilities of these different results.
This state vector is not usually easy to see as a picture of the system,
in the way that the Newtonian mathematical object is a picture of a set
of particles in definite positions, moving in definite directions with definite
velocities. There is indeed a form of the state vector which corresponds to
the particles being in particular positions (though not velocities); but there is
another form corresponding to a different configuration of the particles, and
there is a third form (the “sum” of the other two) which somehow contains
both configurations. This sum tells us probabilities of finding either of the two
configurations when we observe the system, and it is tempting to think of it as
containing the information that the system is in either the one configuration
or the other. But this will not do; its logical consequences are definitely
wrong (it wipes out the “interference effects” which show the wavelike nature
of matter – one of the strange empirical findings which showed the necessity
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for quantum theory in the first place). As a result, it has become common to
say that the third (sum) form of the state vector describes a system which is
in both the first configuration and the second. The mathematical apparatus
of vectors and vector sums seems to support this: the vector sum of a north-
pointing velocity vector and an east-pointing velocity vector is a velocity
vector pointing NE, describing motion in which one is both travelling north
and travelling east. But it is certainly hard to picture an object which is both
here and there, and it is clear why Bohr held that this mathematical structure
should not be seen as any kind of description of a real object. “There is no
quantum world”, he said. “There is only an abstract physical description.
It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is.
Physics concerns what we can say about nature.” [Petersen (1963)]
The situation is even worse than this: if the system in question is not
isolated, but is part of a larger system (as every actual system is part of
the universe), then, in general, the system has no definite state vector. The
larger system may be described by a state vector (though not, in general, if it
is itself part of a still larger system), but this cannot usually be analysed into
unique descriptions of its parts separately. Instead, the overall state vector
will be the sum of a number of components, each of which describes one of
the parts in a definite state and the other part in an associated state. The
two parts are said to be “entangled”.
I have spoken of “observing” the properties of a system, which is appro-
priate language for a realist; there is the physical system, out there, with
its properties, and the physicist, separate and detached, quietly observing.
Every student of physics is taught that this is wrong; the properties can only
be discovered by measuring the system in an active experimental interven-
tion, which, on the scale on which quantum theory is relevant, will inevitably
alter the very properties one wants to observe. For this reason my account of
quantum theory would be frowned at by most physics teachers; wherever I
have used the word “observation”, it should be replaced by “measurement”.
This word, indeed, has become an important and fundamental part of the
theory, with the character of a primitive undefined term in the fundamental
postulates. In its most austere (and anti-realist) form, the theory renounces
any pretension to describe a physical world; it only offers a method for cal-
culating the results of laboratory procedures, each consisting of a specified
preparation followed, after a specified lapse of time, by a specified measure-
ment. The calculation will tell us the possible results of this measurement
and the probabilities for each of them.
This is neither satisfying nor satisfactory. It is not satisfying because,
to many scientists, it misses the whole point of doing science in the first
place. Why would we want to predict the results of experiments? We want
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to understand the world, and we do experiments to check if we’ve got it right
(see Sudbery (1986) p. 214). As John Bell put it,
To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling
laboratory operations is to betray the great enterprise” [Bell (1990)].
It is not satisfactory because it is hardly possible to obey the stern injunc-
tion to consider only laboratory procedures consisting of a single preparation
followed by a single measurement. Often one wants to follow the progress
of events beyond the final measurement. In that case one has to treat the
measurement as a second preparation, giving a new state vector for the sys-
tem which will serve for the start of a new calculation. But the nature of
this preparation, and therefore the identity of the new state vector, depends
on the result of the experiment, which is a random outcome over which the
experimenter has no control. If we follow the state vector after the first
preparation, through the measurement, and beyond, we see an evolution
which changes abruptly and randomly at the time of the measurement. This
is incorporated in the presentation of quantum mechanics in most textbooks,
which (following the original formulation of Paul Dirac (1930) and John von
Neumann (1955)) stipulate that the state vector changes in two distinct ways:
1. Left to itself, the system changes smoothly according to the Schro¨dinger
equation; but
2. If the system is subjected to a measurement, its state vector changes
instantaneously and unpredictably to reflect the result of the measure-
ment. It undergoes “projection”.
Physicists have always felt uneasy about this. It is supposed to be a
fundamental statement of a basic law of nature, on a par with Newton’s laws
of motion. But it lacks the unity and simplicity of Newton’s laws: why are
there two quite different laws applying in different situations? And anyway,
what are these different situations? What is this “measurement” which enters
into the second law as an undefined term? Surely measurements are not
basic constituents of the world. An actual measurement in a laboratory is
conducted with apparatus which can be analysed as a physical system like
any other, and must itself follow the Schro¨dinger equation as in the first
postulate.
This is the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Von Neumann
investigated it by taking the measurement seriously as a physical process,
and considering the quantum description of a total system consisting of the
object being measured together with the measuring apparatus, which inter-
act by means of known forces between them. Following the progress of the
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measurement according to the Schro¨dinger equation yields a total state in
which the object and the apparatus are entangled: the total state vector is a
sum of states in each of which the apparatus shows a definite result and the
object definitely has the property shown by that result. But this total state
vector does not correspond to any particular result. In order to reflect the
fact of experience that a measurement does have a definite unique result, von
Neumann found it necessary to appeal to the second (projection) postulate
after all.
At this level it becomes very tempting to interpret the quantum sum of
state vectors in terms of “or” rather than “and”. In the laboratory it is
surely true, after a measurement has been made, that it had one result or
another. I said earlier that this interpretation leads to conflict with exper-
imental facts, in that it predicts that there will be none of the interference
effects which are characteristic of quantum phenomena (and which are pre-
dicted by the Schro¨dinger equation). But for large things like laboratory
apparatus, these interference effects are far too small and infrequent to be
ever observed; it will never lead to conflict with experiment to assume that
the quantum A+B means that either A happened or B happened. This re-
sult is known as “decoherence”; it is well established in theory (Schlosshauer
(2007)). Nevertheless, it remains an approximate statement; in principle, if
it is taken as an exact statement about the apparatus and the object that its
state vector is the sum of different results, it cannot be understood as stating
that one of these results happened.
In 1957 Hugh Everett challenged von Neumann’s conclusion. Why can’t
we believe, he asked, that the world is described by a state vector which is
the sum of components describing situations which we would recognize as
different and incompatible states of affairs? The immediate answer is that
the world just isn’t like that — we see that it isn’t; we never see such sums.
In terms of Schro¨dinger’s famous example (Schro¨dinger (1935)), we never see
a cat in a state which is the sum of being alive and being dead. Everett’s
reply (anticipated by Schro¨dinger himself) was that the theory tells us that
we will never see such a cat. Since we are ourselves physical objects, the
universal state vector must describe our brains as well as everything else. If
I look at Schro¨dinger’s cat after it has been in his diabolical box for a while,
the physical process by which I see it leads, via Schro¨dinger’s equation, to
an entangled state which is the sum of a state in which the cat is dead and I
see it as dead, and a state in which it is alive and I see it as alive. Nowhere
is there a state of my brain seeing a cat which is the sum of alive and dead.
Everett made the analogy with Copernicus’s revolutionary statement that
the earth moves round the sum and rotates on its axis. To the objection that
it doesn’t feel as if we’re whirling around in space, Copernicus could reply
11
(though he may have had to wait for help from Galileo and Newton) that
the laws of physics show that what it feels like to be whirling round in space
(on a massive gravitating planet) is exactly what we do feel.
Following Everett, there has been a growing body of opinion among physi-
cists in favour of taking quantum theory seriously and literally: it gives us
a mathematical object (the state vector) which constitutes a complete de-
scription of the physical world. This state vector has many parts, each of
which we can recognize as a picture of a world that we can understand —
it contains atoms and molecules in combinations which we know as plan-
ets, and mountains, and trees and tigers and people. But different things
are happening in each of these parts: in some of them Schro¨dinger’s cat is
alive, in some it is dead, in some of them nobody has heard of Schro¨dinger’s
cat because the young Schro¨dinger decided to become a poet rather than a
physicist. The theory contains “many worlds”.
If this is right, our most successful physical theory gives us an account
of reality which contains far more than what we see, or could ever see. If I
do an experiment which has two possible outcomes, A or B, depending on
whether a certain radioactive nucleus has decayed or not in the course of the
experiment, then what I see is that the experiment went one way (say A)
and not the other (B). I believe that A happened and not B (because I saw
it); everyone I ask to check my experiment agrees that I am right; surely, by
all the standards of scientific truth, my belief is justified and I am entitled
to say that in the real world, A happened and B didn’t. Yet the theory tells
me that there is another equally real world in which A didn’t happen but B
did.
So why don’t we look again at the meaning of the quantum description,
with its many worlds? We can have a mathematical description containing
all these worlds, and believe that it is really true, without believing that each
of the worlds is real. Maybe the vector sum occurring in the mathematics
should be interpreted as a disjunction: the statement is that all of these
worlds are possible, but only one is real. The problem with this is that it
requires a precise definition of what will count as a world, as a matter of
basic principle, and this goes against the whole spirit of the theory. We
can look at a particular state vector of the universe and say “Oh yes, this
seems to have a lump here which looks like the kind of world we know, with
people doing experiments and getting unique results; and there’s another
lump there with people getting different results; and over there is a smudge
which doesn’t look like anything much; but they’re all combined together
with this vector sum idea”; but this interpretation will always be ad hoc,
and we can’t give a general rule for recognising worlds which will apply in
advance to any state vector. Those who think this is a problem call it the
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“preferred basis problem” of Everett’s theory.
There seem to be two conflicting accounts of reality here, both authorized
by science. On the one hand, science is based on empirical evidence; what
is revealed by careful experiment is real. On the other hand, it advances by
taking its successful theories seriously; the theoretical entities of a fundamen-
tal theory are real. This tendency has often been resisted by the cautious
— many physicists at the end of the nineteenth century refused to believe in
the reality of atoms – but it seems to me that the general lesson of history
is that reality favours the bold.
It is not, of course, the first time that a general scientific theory has
seemed to be in conflict with intuition. I have already mentioned the conflict
between the theory that the earth spins on its axis and the obvious fact that
the sun goes round the earth once a day. Rutherford’s discovery that atomic
nuclei are so small that atoms are mainly empty space seems to falsify our
perception that the things around us are solid. The lesson of relativity that
physics takes place in space-time is said to show that there is no such thing
as the passage of time. Both determinism and indeterminism are thought,
not necessarily by different people, to make free will impossible.
Scientists often respond to these conflicts by saying that science has re-
vealed that the intuitive belief is an “illusion”. We have the illusion that the
sun goes round the earth; the solidity of stones, the passage of time, free will
– they are all illusions. In nearly every case I think this is a mistake. It is not
an illusion that the sun goes round the earth; Einstein taught us that we are
free to adopt a frame of reference in which the earth is fixed (intuitively, we
can hardly help doing so), and in that frame the sun does indeed go round
the earth. It is not an illusion that stones are solid, it is part of the meaning
of solidity; and it is certainly not an illusion that we have free will, it is a
clear fact of everyday life (once again it is a matter of the meaning of words,
though not an easy one to tease out in this case). In both these cases the
problem arises from confusing a clear everyday concept with an unjustified
pseudo-scientific theory of that concept: solidity does not mean that matter
occupies a mathematical continuum, free will does not mean that we have
the power to interrupt the laws of physics. As for the idea that time is an
illusion, which was even held by Einstein, I have no idea what that is sup-
posed to mean. (What is that we mistakenly believe when we are under this
illusion?)
In all these cases I believe the resolution of the conflict is not that one of
the conflicting ideas is mistaken or illusory, but that there is no conflict. I
would like to apply the same strategy to the conflict between the many worlds
of quantum theory and the one world of experience; but it will involve some
re-examination of our conception of reality.
13
I see this conflict as one of a wide class of philosophical problems which
was identified by Thomas Nagel (1986). These problems arise whenever we
attempt to go beyond our own individual situation and experience to obtain
a more general, objective account of the world – something that we may feel
obliged to do for ethical, political or aesthetic as much as for scientific reasons.
We want to lay aside our individual interests and work for the general good;
go beyond our subjective opinions and attain objective knowledge; move
out of our particular situation and see the overall picture, or, as Nagel puts
it, attain a “view from nowhere” as opposed to the “view from now here”.
The problem is that the objective propositions we reach, which we seem
to have good reason to believe, then appear to conflict with the subjective
experience which is still vividly present to us. Nagel acknowledges the force
of the objective position, but rejects the temptation to dismiss the subjective
experience as merely an illusion; the subjective experience has a vividness
and a reality compared with which the objective truth is abstract, pale,
“etiolated”.
The contrast is beautifully depicted in Blake’s picture of Newton (Fig. 1).
Newton is depicted as a thoroughly physical, muscular young man, but he is
totally concentrated on the abstract mathematical laws of nature. He sees
only the thin, colourless diagram on his scroll, and does not see the colour,
texture and concrete reality of the coral-encrusted rock on which he sits. He
sees all of reality; as we have already noted, the dividers he holds are the
same instrument as that held by God in Blake’s picture of the creation of the
world (Fig. 2). But he also misses all of reality, in the richness behind him.2
Now, in the farthest we have travelled along the journey initiated by
Newton, we find the reality of subjective experience being forced on us by
the abstract theory itself. If we start as fundamentalist physicists, we have
a quantum-mechanical state vector which we think describes the whole of
physical reality at different times. Suppose we find that at a certain time
this state vector contains a world in which there is a scientist preparing
Schro¨dinger’s experiment, putting a cat in a box with a radioactive nucleus
and a phial of volatile poison. At a later time we will see that this part of
the state vector has split into two: one part containing a dead cat and the
scientist with his brain registering the thought “Oh dear, the cat died”, and
another part containing a living cat and the scientist’s brain registering the
thought “Ah, the cat is still alive”. From our external viewpoint, we see that
2As I was writing this talk, the radio was playing music chosen by an explorer. The
music stopped, and I heard him explaining the purpose of his expeditions into the rain
forest. “I was not there as a scientist”, he said, “I was there to understand the place.”
This paradox — aren’t “science” and “understanding” synonymous? — nicely captures
the two sides of Blake’s picture.
14
neither of these thoughts is a true reflection of reality. But the thoughts do
not occur in our external framework; each of them belongs in its own part of
reality, and in that context it fulfils all the conditions for truth: it corresponds
to an actual physical fact, it agrees with the thoughts of all other competent
observers in that part of reality, and so on. Although the two thoughts are
contradictory, each of them is true in its own branch of reality. It is like
the truth of a sentence in a work of fiction (Lamarque & Olsen (1994)); the
sentence takes its truth from the story in which it belongs. In St. Luke’s
gospel, it is true that Christ died on the cross; but in Kazantzakis’s novel
The Last Temptation of Christ it is true that he comes down from the cross
and marries Mary Magdalene. A similar approach to truth and reality can
be used to counter the sceptical thought “Maybe none of this is real; maybe
it is all a dream.” If it is a dream, then the thought “This table is real” is
occurring in the dream, and as such is true: the table is real.
So there is one nature of reality for the many worlds described by quan-
tum theory, another (no less real) for the one world we actually experience.
I like to think that the first view of reality reconciles quantum theory with
Einstein’s belief in a real external world independent of human observers
(though I cannot be confident that Einstein would have agreed). The second
(one-world) type of reality, however, explicitly depends on a particular ob-
server for its definition. I believe that the phenomenon of decoherence makes
it possible to replace this single observer with a community of observers, but
still, the scientific definition of this genus of reality is linked to conscious-
ness. Not necessarily human consciousness, in principle; nevertheless, this
interpretation of quantum mechanics is remarkably close to Tagore’s view.
Tagore could have been referrring to Everett’s paper when he said3
[the world] is a relative world, depending for its reality upon our
consciousness.
This is why my title has (three times) the word “and” (rather than “ver-
sus”). To understand quantum theory, we seem to need Einstein’s reality
and Tagore’s, Newton’s and Blake’s, Everett’s and Bohr’s.
What are we, living in one definite world, to make of the quantum de-
scription of many worlds in a vector sum? How does it affect us? At the start
of his experiment with the cat, Schro¨dinger knows the quantum state vector
that describes how he has set up the experiment, and he can calculate what
it will become at the end of the experiment. It will then describe a world
in which the cat is alive, and another in which it is dead. What does this
3in a part of the conversation with Einstein which is not contained in Singer (2001),
but was unearthed by Partha Ghose
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calculation mean for Schro¨dinger (a) at the start of the experiment, when it
lies in the future, (b) after the experiment, when it lies in the present?
(a) Everybody agrees on how to use a quantum calculation. Before the
experiment, the different worlds in the future state vector describe the differ-
ent possible results. More than that, the relative sizes of these components
give the probabilities for these different results.
(b) Let’s look on the bright side and suppose that the cat lives. Schro¨dinger
has the immediate reality of the living cat in front of him; he also knows that
there is another world with a dead cat in the quantum description. What
can that mean, in his lived reality? He must take it as describing something
that might have happened, but didn’t. However, he can’t cheerfully say “Oh
good, it didn’t happen; let’s stop worrying about it” and start again with a
state vector describing the living cat; that would be to ignore his own equa-
tion and apply the projection postulate, which gives wrong answers. The
chance of an error is tiny, but in principle it is there. To calculate the results
of future experiments, he must take into account the fact that the cat might
have died. What might have happened, but didn’t, can still affect the real
world; therefore it is still a part of reality.
Einstein had two other independent objections to quantum theory. One
of them was his belief in determinism. Realism and determinism are logically
independent — a theory could exhibit either of them without the other —
but it is not always clear that these were distinct for Einstein. In 1949 he
was protesting
I still believe in the possibility of a model of reality – that is
to say, of a theory which represents things themselves and not
merely the probability of their occurrence. [Einstein (1949b), p.
669].
In analysing this statement, one might note that it is not things that occur
but events, and in asking for events themselves to be represented in the
theory, without probabilities, Einstein seems to want all of space-time (past,
present and future) to have definite and univocal existence in the theory.
Such a theory need not be deterministic, in the sense that identical causes
must always be followed by identical effects, but it does require that the
future is fixed (one might say it is “fatalistic”). In any case, in requiring
no probabilities, Einstein does seem to be asking for determinism in the
strong sense. As is well known, he stated elsewhere that “I, at any rate, am
convinced that He [the “old one”] does not throw dice” [Einstein (1971)].
In this respect also, Everettian quantum theory can be seen as meeting
Einstein’s desiderata (though, again, I’m not sure that Einstein would have
been happy with it). The objective, realistic aspect of the theory — the
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“view from nowhere” — is fully deterministic, as the state vector of the
universe obeys the Schro¨dinger equation. Given the state vector at any
one time, the state vector at any future time (and, indeed, any past time)
is completely determined. But, of course, the state vector relative to any
given consciousness is subject to random changes; this aspect of the theory is
completely indeterministic. The “old one” does not play dice with the whole
world, but he does play dice with each one of us. In the view from “now
here”, the future is open (Sudbery (2011a)); the state vector of the universe
gives us only a set of possibilities for our future, together with probabilities
for each of them, but at any given time there is no such thing for us as the
future. This makes it necessary to rethink what we mean, in this internal
perspective, by probability and the truth of statements in the future tense
(Sudbery (2011b)).
In the internal perspective, present truth and reality are guaranteed by
my perceptions (“I” being the observer whose consciousness defines the per-
spective). Clearly, there can be no such guarantee from experience for the
future. Nevertheless, it seems natural to believe that there is such a thing
as my future experience, even though I don’t know what it is; that there is
a true statement about what my future state will be. This is denied by the
quantum calculation: there is nothing to link any one of the components of
the future state vector with the particular component that I am experienc-
ing now. It might also be denied by a naive view, perhaps our own view
as children (“of course there isn’t a definite future, it hasn’t happened yet;
anything could happen”) and it was certainly denied by Aristotle, who, in his
famous passage about the sea-battle (Aristotle (1980)), asserted that state-
ments about the future are neither true nor false. This has been taken by
many logicians as meaning that bivalent logic does not apply to future-tense
statements; there is a third truth value as well as “true” and “false”. But
Aristotle also pointed out that statements about the future can be more or
less likely. This suggests that their truth value lies on a scale between 0 and
1, and should be identified with probability.
So from the internal perspective, there is one component of the present
universal state vector which represents the truth now, and present-tense
statements have truth values 0 or 1 determined by their consonance with
this component. Future-tense statements have truth values equal to the
probabilities calculated by quantum mechanics.
This suggests further elaboration of the external perspective. In this per-
spective the universal state vector represents the whole truth about reality.
If this is the sum of many components describing worlds that we could rec-
ognize, then it is often said that these many worlds are “all equally real”.
But there is no warrant for that “equally”. These components do not have
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equal lengths as vectors; if that length should happen to be zero, then the
corresponding world is not real. A component with a length which is tiny but
not actually zero, however, is supposed on this view to be fully real. It seems
much better to say that full reality belongs only to the actual universal state
vector; any other vector (for example, one of the components representing a
recognisable “world”) has a lesser degree of reality measured by its contri-
bution to the universal state vector. In symbols, if the universal state vector
is
Ψ = c1Ψ1 + c2Ψ2 + · · ·
where Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . describe different recognisable worlds, then the degree of
reality of the world Ψ1 is |c1|2, that of Ψ2 is |c2|2, and so on.
In the external perspective, Everettian quantum mechanics is a realis-
tic, deterministic theory — just what Einstein wanted. I feel pretty sure,
however, that he would not have been satisfied with it. The problem is that
neither the external perspective nor the internal one have a third feature that
Einstein regarded as essential in a scientific theory, namely locality, or more
generally separability:
Now it appears to me that one may speak of the real factual
situation of the partial system S2. . . . But on one supposition
we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast; the real factual
situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with the
system S1, which is spatially separated from the former. [Einstein
(1949a) p. 85]
The existence of entanglement means that it is not possible to divide the
world into pieces in such a way that the real factual situation of the whole
world is completely described by putting together the real factual situations
of its parts; indeed, the parts do not have their own real factual situations.
In particular, one cannot divide space-time into regions and describe these
regions independently of each other. The theory is nonlocal or holistic.4
Conclusion
It has often been remarked that there is little engagement between Einstein
and Tagore in their conversation on the nature of reality. They both state
4I should add that this is currently a matter of controversy. I have been following
Everett in using the Schro¨dinger picture as a description of reality. Deutsch and Hayden
(Deutsch & Hayden (2000); Deutsch (2012)) claim that the Heisenberg picture gives a
fully separable description of the world, but it is not clear that this is valid (Wallace &
Timpson (2007)).
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their views, which just sail past without affecting each other. The sole dis-
cussion between Everett and Bohr was described by Everett’s biographer as
“simply a polite hearing and a lot of mumbling” and by Everett himself as
“that was a hell of a—doomed from the beginning” (Byrne (2010), pages 168
and 221). It is hard to even imagine a meeting between Newton and Blake.
My thesis here has been that although these incompatibilities are real, we
do not have to choose one side or the other: we can understand the differ-
ent contexts in which notions of truth and reality apply, and we can place
ourselves in either context at will, without inconsistency. Quantum theory
forces us to consider both; and each context shows us a different nature of
reality.
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